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By Ayesha Abbasi

In recent years both the United States and India committed themselves to an enduring partnership first through what was called a “strategic handshake” and later through a “technological handshake”. These initiatives further precipitated when both sides realized that the American Rebalance to Asia strategy converged with India’s “Act East” policy which aimed at seeking better relations East Asian neighbours. In line with these developments, according to the U.S. Department of State, Indo-U.S. defence trade increased from roughly USD 1 Billion to over USD 15 Billion since 2008. This covered the transfer of various air-borne platforms and conventional weapon systems. Overall the expectations from these initiatives were immense but the outcome has not been as tangible, as will be discussed shortly.

Question that now arises is whether through such special treatment, the U.S. has bought Indian loyalties and whether in time of need, India would put U.S. interests over its own just because the latter has flourished numerous favours on it. The answer to these is just one word  unlikely! India’s recent actions like its deal with Russia to acquire S-400 Triumpf air defence missile system and import of Iranian oil are just two examples. Despite U.S. pressure, India remained committed to conclude the deal with Russia to buy the S-400 system. The U.S. Congress on the other hand, in an attempt to facilitate India, went ahead and exempted it from the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) which was aimed at targeting Russia and also allowed sanctioning of countries having significant transactions with the country. While the justification given for this exception was that U.S. did not want to harm its own friends, the same leniency has not been shown to Turkey which was threatened with sanctions under CAATSA, if it went ahead with the S-400 deal with Russia.

On Iran, India has communicated to the U.S. the difficulties it will face if oil imports from Iran were halted. Previously, when President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj had categorically stated that India follows UN sanctions, and not U.S. sanctions  thereby implying that India’s import of Iranian crude oil will continue despite U.S. sanctions on Iran. Now that the U.S. has offered India some waivers to decrease its reliance on Iranian oil, it is yet to be seen how India wriggles itself out of this tough situation.

While Russia and Iran are seen as important threats to the U.S., China is the root cause of growing Indo-U.S. partnership. China’s military presence in the South China Sea and its so-called “predatory economics” in Western Asia and Europe continue to fuel the American urge to contain its rise. In U.S. view, India’s alleged perception of China as a primary threat to national security, make it a natural counter-weight to Chinese rise in the region. However, what is being deliberately or unintentionally overlooked is China and India’s momentously enmeshed economy  with the bilateral trade hitting a historic high of USD 84.44 Billion in 2017 despite the Doklam Standoff between the two in mid-2017.

If the U.S. wants to wean India away from being economically dependent on China, it will have to replace China as India’s top trading partner. However, it would not be possible in the face of Trump Administration’s rigid trade policies. Once India failed to escape from recent U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminium, it retaliated with its own tariffs worth USD 240 million on 29 American export items this year in June. The Trump Administration’s closing of its markets to imports while seeking concessions on exports will continue to damage the Indo-U.S. economic relationship. Keeping these economic realities in mind, it is unlikely that India will partner with U.S. as a front-runner against China in a full-fledged conflict between the two global powers. Primarily because border skirmishes with China is one thing and a full-scale wall involving world’s leading powers in capability and technology is another. Hence, India may continue to willingly engage strategically with the U.S. till the level of receiving military assistance  which can be used against Pakistan in times of crises  and to the extent of participating in military exercises  to polish its war-fighting techniques.

If seen from the prism of Indo-U.S. strategic partnership, the United States’ China-containment-strategy is itself ill-defined. Both the Indian and American definitions of the Indo-Pacific are different which may lead to a different interpretation of any future action that they may have to take in the region. Such improper constructs do not limit themselves to different definitions, but also in the means that U.S. may employ to contain China. Geographically, India’s location makes it an important actor to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative; however it is unclear how China’s economic expansion could be countered with the help of military technology that the U.S. aims to transfer to India. Especially in light of recent events when both India and China committed to enhance their military ties  this will include joint-exercises and training activities  and increased defence interaction.

With a number of heavily loaded agreements such as the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement, Defence Technology and Trade Initiative, Logistic Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), Strategic Trade Authorization (STA-1) status to India, recently-finalized Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA), it was hoped that the bilateral relation will undergo a marked shift in a very short time. However, these arrangements continue to face a limbo. The nuclear agreement is yet to bear tangible fruits. Same goes for the LEMOA. STA-1 is a major development; however the (in) efficacy of this will depend on how India uses this status. Yet, technology and capability-sharing after this have a tendency to affect the international nuclear and conventional non-proliferation norms  especially now that India is part of the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

Further, COMCASA is being hailed as a major agreement as it is expected to facilitate India to obtain critical defense technologies from the U.S., while accessing critical communication networks that will help in ensuring interoperability among the U.S. and the Indian armed forces. However, it is yet to be seen how India will deal with potential U.S. intrusiveness in the functioning of both indigenous Indian systems and the ones acquired by Russia. Such agreements and engagement with the U.S. allow India to project itself as a country of global significance. During their bilateral interactions, by promoting their mutual ideal of democracy, India paints itself as a country that is at par with the leading global superpower. If anything, these developments have strengthened Indian view of itself as being deserver of such status, while emboldening it to pursue regional strategies and policies that are detrimental to overall regional peace. Overall this assertion would not be untrue that India’s non-alignment strategy continues, even if it is not the official policy anymore. India has seen the benefits of remaining non-aligned and it would not commit itself to one global power at the detriment of its own national and security interests. Bottom-line is, in this union, only one side reaping major benefits; making it a commensal rather than symbiotic relationship, as the U.S. may have hoped.