For the same reasons that the US-backed government failed after 2001, it will be equally difficult for the new Taliban government to establish its dominance
By Patrick Cokeburn
World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001. It was immediately clear that the United States would retaliate by forcibly removing the Taliban, who had retained Osama bin Laden and allowed al-Qaeda to establish its headquarters in Afghanistan. I flew to Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, hoping to cross the Amu Darya River into northeastern Afghanistan, which was occupied by the Northern Alliance against the Taliban.
The Tajik authorities did not allow it, and I began to make romantic but largely unrealistic plans to cross the river illegally and reach the Panjshir Valley, south of Kabul, through the mountains of the Hindu Kush. Fortunately, the Northern Alliance was allowed to take a few journalists, including me, to Panjshir by an ancient Russian-made helicopter, where I spent the next 10 weeks.
Panjshir is one of the strongest natural forts in the world, surrounded by lush green plains that are difficult to conquer. It is located 90 miles south of Kabul, and because it has arrow-like scales on the capital, it is of great military importance to anyone in possession. As a result, the area has been a frequent battleground since Russia invaded Afghanistan in 1979 in support of the communist government.
The debris accumulated as a result of the war was not picked up by anyone then or in later years. So when I got there, the valley and the surrounding area looked like an open-air museum reflecting important events in Afghanistan’s recent history. Arriving there, I saw that after the defeat of Russia in the 1980s, their surviving debris was scattered in the valley plains in the form of Russian tank structures.
In some places, old tank tires were inserted to fill deep potholes, making it feel as if a car was driving over a rocky river. I saw an armored vehicle moving as a taxi with its roof removed and its use due to its ability to cross rough terrain. If we talk about everyday life, Afghans were back in the Middle Ages. It had no management other than electricity from small generators, and it was rare for broken bridges to be replaced with swinging wooden structures.
Jabal Siraj, a village at the entrance to Panjshir, is the headquarters of the Northern Alliance, which the Taliban have repeatedly tried to seize by fighting militant leaders. He was a former leader of the anti-communist resistance, but in a way there was little difference between him and the bandits.
Before retreating, the Taliban had almost succeeded in capturing Jabal Siraj. At the entrance to the village, a magnificent monument to their defeat was erected in the form of a bridge connecting dozens of armored vehicles snatched from the Taliban in a deep gorge. Central to the fight against the Taliban was Bagram Air Base, which soon became the headquarters and strategic location of the US military and was eventually evacuated in recent days.
When I was there, like many other parts of Afghanistan, there was an undeclared ceasefire. Outside their fronts, the militants usually planted geraniums, which, along with the Afghans’ love of flowers, also signaled that no more dangerous situation was taking place. If US warplanes could clear their way, then Northern Alliance commanders would have little intention of fighting.
This was inherent in the nature of the ongoing war in Afghanistan, which was a complication for foreigners. There would have been a long period of peace after the ceasefire. Rapid advance and retreat resulted in less military activity and more consequence of changing sides of the main characters or making a deal with their enemies. Their self-interested thinking is reflected in an Afghan proverb that says, “Afghans never lose a war because they always change sides before the end of the war (meaning go with the winner) unexpected change of allegiance can be devastating.
Near the north of Panjshiri was the Salang Tunnel, the only ever available route connecting the northern and southern parts of the country through the Hindu Kush. The warlord who protected it in the late 1990s pretended to join the Taliban, and when thousands of their fighters began to pass through, it exploded into a tunnel from behind, killing the Taliban. The pier came down.
US aerial bombardment was very effective when it was launched in October 2001. When missiles and bombs were dropped on the Taliban’s vanguard, I saw flames rising in the air and a few fine smoke-like lines rising from Kabul. With the backing of the United States, the Northern Alliance captured the capital a few weeks later without any resistance.
The impression was given that the United States was very strong and the Afghan opposition was very weak, but it was very misleading. The Taliban, of course, lost the war, but they fought in name only, most of whom fled to their villages or across the border in Pakistan, which, albeit in secret, always helped them accidentally passed through the main Taliban route.
A local guide in Kandahar washed his hands and followed me to get his services, so to get rid of him, I said I wanted to meet the local Taliban chief and talk to the opium farmers. I thought it would take him a few days to manage as much as he could, but the guide said we were going to his village right now. We first met opium growers who said they had grown vegetables because the Taliban had strongly advised them to grow opium instead. He said that only with opium can he get a decent amount of money to support himself.
Shortly afterwards, local Taliban leaders, some of whom held key middle-ranking positions in Kabul, such as district police officers, entered a building in the form of military detachments used to occupy the entire village. The local leaders, who looked invincible in their tactics and tone, made it clear that they would fight again if the attitude of the new government in Afghanistan did not suit them.
Most of the mistakes that have been made in Afghanistan over the past two decades could have been estimated in 2001-2002. The US-backed government brought back the warlords who used deception to extort money from the Americans. As far as the Americans themselves are concerned, their financial support has not been as selfless as it is thought, a huge amount of which has never escaped the hands of the United States or has gone straight back to paying huge salaries to advisers and security teams.
The state of health and education has improved, but the poverty situation in the countryside remains dire. The Afghan government’s constitutional position was weakened by its dependence on foreigners. Pakistan has never been slow to cooperate with the Taliban. Ten years later, in 2011, speaking to people inside Kabul, I was shocked by the fierce hatred of the government, even by those critical of the Taliban and their actions.
Afghanistan is made up of different races, languages, cultures and tribes. This is the main reason why it is very difficult to control it permanently. Diplomats are now talking about the Taliban’s recapture of Kabul, but I don’t think it will be that easy. For the same reasons that the US-backed government failed after 2001, it will be equally difficult for the new Taliban government to establish its dominance.
Courtesy: The Independent.