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According to Bob Woodward in his book ‘Bush At War’, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Powell decided that Pakistan was bound to be the linchpin if the US was to take on the Al Qaeda on its turf. He and his deputy Richard Armitage then drew up a list of seven demands from Pakistan .

1. Stop Al Qaeda operatives at your border, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and end ALL logistical support for (Osama) bin Laden,
2. Blanket overfreight and landing rights,
3. Access to Pakistan, naval bases, air bases and borders,
4. Immediate intelligence and immigration information,
5. Condemn the Sept 11 attacks, curb all domestic expression of support for terrorism against the United States, its friends and allies,
6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop Pakistani volunteers from going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban, and
7. Break diplomatic relations with the Taliban and assist us to destroy (Osama) bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network.

‘In so many words,’ says Woodward, ‘Powell and Armitage would be asking Pakistan to help destroy what its intelligence service had helped create and maintain: The Taliban.’ A CIA insider, Michael F. Scheuer, author ofImperial Hubris, later agreed in the Washington Times of 7th April 2006 that Musharraf has been doing ‘the US ‘s dirty work against his country’s national interest’. Secretary of State Powell called Musharraf in Islamabad. ‘As one general to another, we need someone on our flank fighting with us,’ he says, and then adds meaningfully: ‘Speaking candidly, the American people would not understand if Pakistan was not in this fight with the United States.’

To Powell’s surprise, says Woodward, Musharraf promises to support the US with each of the seven actions. An elated Powell then conveys his achievement at a National Security Council meeting in the White House Situation Room, saying: ‘I’d like to tell you what we told the Pakistanis today,’ before loudly and proudly reading out the seven demands. When he finishes, he tells the meeting that Musharraf has already accepted them. ‘It looks like you got it all,’ Bush says. Others in the room ask for a copy of the US charter of demands (pp. 47, 59, 61).

Centcom web page on Pakistan

US CENTCOM published a page on their website in 2002 listing details of the co-operation they had received from various countries, including Pakistan, since September 2001. This brief report about Pakistan ‘s contribution had been available on the following link:

‘Immediately after 9/11, Pakistan was prompt in declaring unequivocal support to US in its war against terrorism. It expressed its complete solidarity with US in combating terrorism in all forms and, was willing to provide not only moral but also logistical support and its military bases. Details of the efforts and participation of Pakistan and the adverse effects of following this policy are given in the ensuing paragraphs:

1. Support Provided by Pakistan for OEF. Up till Oct 2002, some of the specific assistance provided by Pakistan for Operation Enduring Freedom is as follows:
2. Provision of Air Bases / Airfields. In order to meet the requirement of US/Coalition Forces, Pakistan provided five air bases / airfields. However in emergency planes could land anywhere in Pakistan . On the average 0.4 million litres of fuel per day has been provided to US forces as well as all other services on the bases used by them. A total of 57800 sorties have been generated from Pakistan ‘s air space/soil.
3. Provision of Air Corridor. In order to facilitate launching of air ops into Afghanistan, Pakistan provided 2/3 of its air space as air corridor to the US/Coalition Forces. By so doing, Pakistan had to reschedule/ redirect many of the commercial flights.
4. Provision of Naval Facilities. Pakistan Navy provided landing facility to the US/Coalition ships at Pasni. At sea, Pakistan Navy operations/training were curtailed in order to accommodate and facilitate the operations of US/Coalition Naval Forces. According to the US Marine Corps Gazette of June 2002, the Coalition Naval Operations at Pasni were the largest amphibious operations in size, duration and depth that the Marine Corps had conducted since the Korean War. In all, 8000 Marines, 330 vehicles and over 1350 tons of equipment/logistic were off loaded at the beach and later flown to Kandahar from Pasni.
5. Summary of US Requests. Details of request since 11 September 2001 are as follows:
6. A) Requests received 2160
7. B) Action completed 2008
8. C) Action in process 152
9. Foreign Nationals Apprehended. Two of the most wanted Al-Qaida terrorists, Abu-Zubaida and Ramzi Bin Al-Shaiba, were arrested by the Pakistan’s law enforcing agencies during well planned and carefully conducted raids and handed over to US authorities. Abu Zubaida was considered Number 2 man in Al Qaida leadership thus his apprehension has given a boost to OEF. Ramzi Bin Al-Shaiba is suspected to be actually involved in the terrorist attacks of September 11. Overall details since 11 September 2001 are:
10. A) Total Raids 99
11. B) Foreign National Apprehended 420
12. C) Handed Over to USA 332
13. D) Extradited to countries other than USA 34
14. E) Released 38
15. F) Under Interrogation 16
16. ISAF. To facilitate the operations of ISAF in Afghanistan, the Karachi Airport (FMB) and Sea Port facilities along with logistic support have been extended. A MOU in this regard was signed between the Governments of UK and Pakistan. Now that the role of lead Nation has been taken over by Turkey, the same facilities / assistance are being provided to them.
17. Pakistan’s operations along Pak-Afghan border
18. Measures Taken to Penetrate “Tribal Areas”. Tora Bora operations provided a window of opportunity to penetrate these areas which was capitalized by quickly moving the Army in Tirah Valley which captured 250 Al Qaida / Taliban fleeing into Pakistan. Later the Pak Army along with FC extended its operations to Miran Shah and Wana. In return, tribals have been offered a sizeable development package.

The region, being remote and under developed warrants bringing it at par with rest of the country in terms of provision of basic facilities like communication infrastructure, health, education and employment opportunities. Same analogy is being followed in North Waziristan Agency / South Waziristan Agency (NWA / SWA) to prevent slipping in of Al Qaida / Taliban into our territory. In spite of ominous threat on Eastern Border, Pakistan is maintaining a sizeable portion of her strategic forces on Western Border. This clearly speaks of our resolve to support coalition operations against Al Qaida / Taliban elements.

2. On 25 June 2002, an operation was launched against suspected Al Qaida/Taliban elements in area Azam Warsak (Wana). During this operation 2 x Al Qaida members were killed, one apprehended whereas 13 x security personnel were killed including 2 x officers. This shows Pakistan’s resolve to not only “drain the swamp” but also nab the “alligators”.
3. Our Compulsions
4. Shortage of manpower, technical equipment and funds.
5. Threats of war from India due to unresolved Kashmir dispute despite UN resolutions and Indian / international commitments even after 54 years.
6. Constitutional restraint of operations in the FATAs
7. (Federally Administered Tribal Areas).
8. Domestic sensitivity to allow operations within Pak
9. territory by foreign soldiers.
10. Cultural and religious sensitivities.
11. Deployment of Forces
12. Initial Deployment. Initially two Army corps along with large contingents of FC troops (para military) were deployed along Western border including some of the areas hitherto considered as no go tribal areas. A total of 60,000 regular troops and 55000 paramilitary personnel were employed on sealing of western border, internal security duties and protection of various bases being used by US / Coalition Forces. Later bulk of the regular formations was shifted towards the eastern border due to Indian Military build up. Because of very effective security arrangements ensured by Pakistan, not a single breach of security has occurred around the bases in use by Coalition Forces.
13. Current Deployment. In spite of imminent threat of war on our Eastern border and at peril to our security Army till today continues to retain 3 x brigades size regular force along with 40 x FC Wings totalling approximately 45000 troops along Pak-Afghan Border.
14. On Going Operations. A division (-) size force is operating along Pak-Afghan border with the purpose of eliminating suspected Al Qaida/Taliban elements and regular monitoring.
15. effects of operation enduring

freedom on economy of Pakistan

Operation Enduring Freedom adversely affected the already fragile economy of Pakistan. Major losses were caused to the civil aviation, tourism, investment and shipping due to rise in the rates of insurance. Besides this, Pakistani exports also suffered adversely and foreign investments experienced a visible decline. According to a rough estimate, Pakistan ‘s economy suffered a loss of over US$ 10 billion since October 2001.”

Pakistan has established 665 check-posts (each comprising about 40-plus soldiers) along her side of the 600 kilometre Durand Line. As against this, the coalition forces and Afghan National army between them have only 69 posts on the Afghan side. The current strength of 75,000 troops deployed along the Durand Line by Pakistan includes 42 wings of different corps, three divisions, nine brigades from two regional headquarters, 27 infantry battalions, four engineering battalions plus a couple of FC corps. This is in sharp contrast to the strength of US and Afghan troops across the border which is less than 25,000 men all told (‘The Dawn’). Apart from deployment by the army, a Pakistan Navy frigate operates alongside the US Navy on patrol duties in the Persian Gulf. In view of the growing confrontation between Iran and the United States , potentially, it could lead to awkward and anxious moments in the country’s relations with Iran . According to the ‘Dawn’, during a visit to Islamabad by the First Sea Lord in 2003, it was agreed that NATO war ships may patrol inside Pakistan ‘s territorial waters. Strictly speaking, this amounts to surrender of territorial sovereignty that can only be done through an act of the National Assembly and not through any old executive order.