No Widgets found in the Sidebar

I am highly grateful to Rabta Forum International and Nusrat Mirza sahib for inviting me to give a talk on a very important topic: “Pakistan is a Responsible Nuclear State”.

 My talk revolves around answering the following four important questions:

1.  Why did Pakistan acquire the nuclear capability?

2.  What are factors of nuclear instability in South Asia?

3.  Is Pakistan a responsible nuclear state?

4. What needs to be done in order to bring nuclear stability in South Asia?

1. Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear capability:

It is a fact that Pakistan was created in a very vulnerable and hostile environment. Since its inception, Pakistan has been facing severe security threats from both its eastern and western neighbors  India and Afghanistan respectively. In order to ensure its security and survival, Pakistan initially became the part of US-sponsored military pacts  SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organization) and Cento (Central Treaty Organization). Being militarily weak State, Pakistan thought that these military alliances would provide security guarantees against India. However, these military alliances and as a result the enhanced defense capabilities could not save Pakistan from its dismemberment in 1971 that had mainly occurred due to India’s direct intervention in its internal affairs.

Moreover, the Indian nuclear tests in 1974 not only did further add to Pakistan’s insecurity and complicated the security dilemma, but also disturbed the whole strategic scenario of South Asia. Pakistan which was already facing power asymmetry vis-à-vis India in conventional weapons had to face an arch-rival with nuclear weapons, thus, posing an existential threat to its security.

In order to counter the Indian nuclear threat, Pakistan adopted a two-pronged strategy. The first prong of the strategy was to seek diplomatic support at the international level to contain the Indian nuclear capability by declaring South Asia a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) through the UN General Assembly. And secondly, Pakistan embarked upon its own indigenous nuclear program; and by 1980s succeeded in developing its nuclear weapons.

Pakistan became an overt nuclear weapon state when it conducted six nuclear tests in May 1998 in response to five nuclear tests by India in the same month. It must be noted that there are different and opposing set of reasons to acquire nuclear capability by India and Pakistan. For India, the nuclear weapons are ‘status-driven’, with the ambition to become a regional as well as global power; and at the same time an easy way to seek the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. On the other hand, for Pakistan the nuclear weapons are meant for an ultimate guarantee of its security against much bigger enemy with malicious designs, India. Interestingly, India did not face any immediate security threat on both occasions of its nuclear testing.

2. Nuclear instability in South Asia:

Answering the second question, i.e., nuclear instability in South Asia, it is a fact that since the introduction of nuclear weapons in the South Asian security theater, no major war has occurred between India and Pakistan. However, both the nuclear-armed neighbors, since then, have faced several major crises that have had the potential to transform into nuclear Armageddon.   

There are three main factors which are the source of constant nuclear instability between India and Pakistan. These included: a) the unresolved dispute of Kashmir; b) the irresponsible behavior of India; and c) the changing interests of extra-regional powers in South Asia.

a)  The unresolved dispute of Kashmir:

It is a fact that Kashmir has been a constant source of instability between India and Pakistan. Two out of three major wars have occurred on Kashmir. Although there has been no major war between India and Pakistan since 1971, however, there have been four major crises on Kashmir. The first was the 1990 crisis in which both the states nearly went to war over Kashmir when an indigenous Kashmiri uprising had started against the oppressive Indian rule. The second one was the limited war in Kargil in 1999. The third one was the military stand-off in 2001-2002after the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. And the last one is the recent Pulwama incident in February this year. All these crises enhanced fears of escalation and potential nuclear war.

b) The irresponsible behavior of India:

The irresponsible behavior of India since its becoming of nuclear weapon state in 1970s is also a major factor in disturbing the nuclear stability of South Asia. This could be seen in terms of four aspects. First, a continued arms-build-up by India, which is among ‘the top-10 military spending country of the world, and also the world’s largest weapon importer country.’ Since Modi’s coming into power, India has focused more on modernizing the Indian defense forces. The statistics show that the Indian defense budget is around 50 billion dollars that it announced in February 2019. This huge defense spending have serious repercussions on the weaker country like Pakistan to rely more on its nuclear option to counter India’s superiority in conventional weapons. 

The second aspect of the Indian irresponsible behavior could be seen in the aftermath of the Pulwama incident. Putting blame on Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), the Indian Air Force carried out an air raid on Balakot under its Cold Start Doctrine with the calculation that Pakistan would not react to it. However, Pakistan saw it a violation of the international border and decided to respond militarily. In a swift retaliatory air strike, Pakistan shot down two Indian fighter jets and captured one of the IAF pilots, who was later on released by Pakistan as a good will gesture. It was also an attempt on Pakistan’s part to to de-escalate the situation. Instead of reciprocating Pakistan’s efforts, India deployed nuclear capable missiles and nuclear submarines. On the other hand, Pakistan behaved in a responsible manner and did not strike it in spite of detecting it, knowing the horrible consequences of nuclear exchange.

Various statements of the Indian political leadership also show their war-monger nature and completely misunderstanding the phenomenon of nuclear disaster. Modi in the post-Pulwama crisis said that ‘Indian nuclear weapons are not for Diwalii.” Although Pakistan has the capability to counter the Indian aggression and its aggressive behavior, it at the same time believes that a nuclear war between the two countries is unimaginable. Responding to Modi’s statement, the ISPR spokesperson said that “this is a weapon of deterrence and political choice. No sane country having this capability would talk about using it.”  This also confirms that Pakistan believes in the nuclear deterrence and would not involve in any nuclear adventure by deploying nuclear missiles aiming at India.

Third, the Indian irresponsible behavior could be seen in its changing nature of military doctrine. The worrisome aspect is that India under its Cold Start proactive doctrine, which meant to establish and enhance the Indian military capability to launch a retaliatory conventional strike against Pakistan with an objective to inflict a significant damage to Pakistan before the intervention of international community, and, at the same time, also deny Pakistan a justification to use the nuclear weapons. Responding to Indian Cold Start doctrine, Pakistan’s use of tactical nuclear weapons under its Full Spectrum Doctrine (FSD) may further deteriorate the nuclear stability in South Asia. Again, in order to counter Pakistan’s FSD, India released a new doctrine known as “The Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces 2017” in April 2017. The doctrine talks about ‘credible deterrence’ as opposed to previously announced ‘credible minimum deterrence’. This is a major shift in the Indian doctrine. According to an Indian origin nuclear strategist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Prof. Vipin Narang, “India may carry out a ‘full comprehensive counter force strike that attempts to completely disarm Pakistan of its nuclear weapons so that India does not have to expose its cities to nuclear destruction.” (Dawn, 22 March 2017). This means an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear assets. And for this India may use a massive first strike option in order to deny Pakistan using the tactical nuclear weapons. This would lead to further escalation of the conflict. For instance, the deployment of nuclear capable missiles and nuclear submarines during the recent crisis as well as the statements of the Indian leadership show that it is moving away from its policy of ‘No-First-Use’ (NFU). Moreover, its pre-emptive strike option also makes the situation more vulnerable and increases chances of nuclear exchange between the two countries greater.

Lastly, The Indian irresponsible behavior could also be seen in its rejection to sign the NPT, thus, undermining the global arms control efforts. India actually links its signing of the NPT to that of the global disarmament process. Here, one may equally hold responsible the global powers, especially the US, of their support to the Indian nuclear program. Instead of pressurizing India to sign the NPT and renounce its nuclear capability, Washington has signed nuclear deal with New Delhi. The Deal is an attempt, on the part of the US, to acknowledge India as a legitimate nuclear power. The US actually projects a greater Indian role in the region in order to counter China. The US tilt towards India may encourage the latter to commit a reckless act in a future India-Pakistan crisis. At the same time, India has also been rejecting various Pakistani proposals to make South Asia a nuclear free region in order to establish nuclear stability in the region. These included: declaring South Asia a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ); No War Pact; and the Strategic Restraint Regime.

c) The changing interests of extra-regional powers in South Asia:

The changing interests of extra-regional powers, particularly the US, is also an important factor contributing the nuclear instability in the region. This could be seen in case of the Indo-US nuclear that has disturbed the ‘nuclear deterrence equation’ between India and Pakistan. It is noted that under the Deal, the US not only have removed the sanctions that were imposed after the nuclear tests in 1998, but also started high-tech cooperation with India, ignoring the sensitivities of Pakistan. Here, one may argue that as compared to India, Pakistan has suffered a lot for developing its nuclear weapons, and has been treated unfairly for doing the same.    

3. Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state:

It is a fact that Pakistan did not initiate nuclearization in South Asia. It is a responsible nuclear state. It is easy to understand that Pakistan has acquired nuclear capability amid lot of international pressures and sanctions. Therefore, it may not risk losing this capability by behaving in an irresponsible way. For Pakistan, nuclear weapons are meant to deter India. On the other hand, “the international community views Pakistan’s nuclear weapons as threat to regional and international security. These views of the international community are based upon three major concerns.”

The first concern is related to Pakistan’s involvement in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Pakistan has been accused of assisting the nuclear programs of Iran, Libya and North Korea. This has been done through A.Q. Khan’s global proliferation network. It was either an individual act or involvement of few people, but not the involvement of any institution or the state policy of Pakistan. When this was revealed in 2004, Pakistan took various severe measures and arrested Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the ‘father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb.’ Dr. Khan was, later on, pardoned and released. However, his mobility was restricted. Pakistan succeeded in doing so because of its active involvement as a frontline state in the US-led war on terror. In preventing such happenings in future, Pakistan in 2005 also established The Strategic Export Controls Division with Legislation prohibiting the export from Pakistan of either nuclear materials or expertise.’

Second, with reference to western fear of terrorists may get access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons or technology, it’s a less likely scenario, because of three reasons: first, over the years, Pakistan has developed a robust command and control system with reliable safety arrangements. Two, the military operations against the terrorist groups across the country have largely weakened them, though may not have eliminated them altogether. Three, although Pakistan has been allegedly involved in the proliferation of nuclear technology, it has never provided nuclear material or technology to non-state actors to be used against any other state, including India. 

Thirdly, the western fear related to Pakistan’s use of nuclear weapons against India as its nuclear doctrine envisages the first use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s policy of ‘First Use’ of nuclear weapons is conditional, i.e., in case if India commits any aggression. It is true that Pakistan’s adoption of this offensive posture is due to the aggressive nature of its much bigger neighbor, India. Therefore, for Pakistan security is the matter of its survival. Moreover, the asymmetry in conventional weapons between India and Pakistan has deepened the sense of insecurity of the latter, and compelled it to rely more on nuclear weapons to counter the Indian threat. Even in the recent crisis, Pakistan followed the the policy of nuclear restraint, and did not reciprocate to the deployment of nuclear missiles and submarines by India.

4. What Needs to be Done?

It is a fact that nuclear weapons have occupied a central feature in the overall defense and security relations between India and Pakistan. It is a fact that in all major crises since both India and Pakistan have become nuclear, the region has narrowly escaped the nuclear disaster. Both India and Pakistan need to understand that in the absence of sufficient warning system, with short flight timing, and along with a high element of mistrust, the time for decision making is highly condensed. Moreover, as compared to the US-USSR stable nuclear deterrence during the Cold War era, India-Pakistan nuclear deterrence is highly precarious, and has the potential to breakdown. This is because a number of factors that were absent between the US and USSR, are very much present in case of India and Pakistan. For instance, there was no territorial dispute between the US and the Soviet Union, while in case of India and Pakistan an active dispute in the form of Kashmir is present. Second, there were no contiguous borders between the US and the Soviet Union; while both India and Pakistan share a long border. Third, there was no historical enmity and religious division between the US and the Soviet Union; while both India and Pakistan carry a long history of religious and cultural enmity. Fourth, both the US and the Soviet Union never directly confronted with each other, knowing the fact that a direct war between the super powers might lead to a nuclear exchange. Here, in case of India and Pakistan, there is a history of three major wars and several limited wars. Lastly, both the US and the Soviet Union had concluded various arms control treaties; while India and Pakistan have yet to achieve this milestone.

Now the question is: how can such a disaster be prevented? It is true that dialogue among nations is a civilized approach. Therefore, in the first place, being nuclear-armed neighbors, both India and Pakistan need to initiate the negotiation process between them. And for this, the revival of the Composite Dialogue process may be a good opportunity.

Secondly, the role and responsibility of the big powers, particularly the US and Russia, cannot be completely ruled out. Any effort to achieve the arms control and disarmament would remain meaningless if the big powers do not take the issue of nuclear proliferation seriously. They need to fulfill their responsibility of achieving the goal of nuclear non-proliferation by firmly adhering to the provisions of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that emphasizes upon disallowing the supply of nuclear technology to the non-members. For example, instead of putting pressure on India to sign the NPT, the US not only has signed the nuclear deal with it, but also supporting the Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group.

Moreover, the big powers also need to work together to strengthen arms control regimes at the global level as well as moving them down to the regional level. Unfortunately, the recent withdrawal of the US from the INF Treaty would severely affect the global arms control regimes. The alarming situation is that the US has intended to deploy new intermediate range missiles in Asia. The likely target is China, which may also respond in a similar way. Thus, there is a likelihood of a new arms race in Asia that may affect the whole world at large and particularly the South Asia region, where India and Pakistan have now clearly sided with their respective allies  the US and China respectively.

Conclusion:

In the end, I would say that the prevention of war between India and Pakistan is the only viable and rational option. And both the nuclear-armed neighbors need to be very careful of the associated risks of allowing a military conflict to escalate beyond a certain level. Unfortunately, the post-Pulwama adventurism of India confirms the war-mongering attitude of the current Modi government. Being the bigger state, India needs to avoid any adventurism that may escalate into a major war, which may lead to a nuclear disaster.

Although Pakistan has the capability to counter the Indian aggression and its aggressive behavior, it, at the same time, also believes that a nuclear war between the two neighbors in unthinkable. It is a fact that Pakistan’s quest for nuclear capability is based upon its fear from the bigger eastern neighbor. Therefore, if such fear is removed, immense opportunities for establishing peace and economic development in South Asia will open up

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.