By Shafiq Ahmad
President Donald Trump’s suspension of U.S. talks with the Taliban has thrown U.S. policy toward Afghanistan into disarray. Beginning in late 2018, and for the first time, the U.S. had put at the forefront of its policy the aim to negotiate a political settlement of the conflict that includes a path for withdrawal of U.S. Forces.
Nearly a year of intensive diplomacy had brought a draft U.S.-Taliban agreement to the verge of signature. Then, on 7 September, Trump upended plans to seal the deal, tweeting that he had invited Taliban leaders to the Camp David presidential retreat and abruptly called off the event.
He followed this news by declaring that talks between the U.S. and the Taliban were “dead”, in effect scuttling the more important negotiations among Afghans that were to follow. In reality, however, Washington has no good alternative to reviving talks on the same basis as before the disruption.
The U.S. should pick up where it left off, concluding an agreement that sets the stage for an intra-Afghan peace process and thus offers hope of ending Afghanistan’s decades-long war. Trump’s skippering of talks has not improved Washington’s limited options in Afghanistan. First, the U.S. could unilaterally withdraw its forces, irrespective of progress toward intra-Afghan negotiations.
In this case, the conflict would continue, with violence likely intensifying as the Taliban seek to capitalize on U.S. withdrawal and the anti-Taliban forces engage in an existential fight. Afghan government forces and allied militias could fracture, particularly if U.S. and other funding decline. Afghanistan’s neighbors and other regional powers would likely back proxies in the ensuing multi-sided struggle.
As U.S. force levels have fallen, battlefield dynamics have steadily shifted in the insurgents’ favor. Option two would see the U.S. maintain current or somewhat reduced troop numbers continue to back up Afghan government counter-insurgency operations in the hope of altering Taliban calculations, and continue to conduct counter-terrorism strikes and raids from inside the country.
“Staying the course”, as this option is often dubbed, is also a recipe for war with no foreseeable end. Over the past decade, despite the U.S. deploying many times more troops (at the peak) than it would plausibly commit today, the U.S. and government forces have not defeated the Taliban. As U.S. force levels have fallen, battlefield dynamics have steadily shifted in the insurgents’ favor. Afghans would pay a high price for either of the first two options. Already, the war in Afghanistan is the world’s deadliest.
The third and best option is to pursue a negotiated settlement of the conflict. This policy choice requires reopening talks with the Taliban as a next step. The Camp David debacle set back talks but probably not fatally; Talban leaders have indicated that they are willing to return to negotiations.
Diplomatic spadework would be needed to get the Afghan government to retreat from its critical rhetoric about the draft deal that burst into the open after the debacle, but this may need to wait for the dust to settle from the 28 September presidential election. The U.S. also would need to rebuild regional powers’ confidence in its commitment to the negotiations route.
In our view, In any case, political process between Taliban and USA should be continued. Al l concerned countries, however, should use Moscow format as it is more reliable and has been determined to resolve the issue. The Afghan Peace suspended USA but Pakistan has efforts to restart it as it is the requirement of USA, Afghan Taliban and all regional powers.
President Donald Trump’s suspension of U.S. talks with the Taliban has thrown U.S. policy toward Afghanistan into disarray. Beginning in late 2018, and for the first time, the U.S. had put at the forefront of its policy the aim to negotiate a political settlement of the conflict that includes a path for withdrawal of U.S. forces.
Nearly a year of intensive diplomacy had brought a draft U.S.-Taliban agreement to the verge of signature. Then, on 7 September, Trump upended plans to seal the deal, tweeting that he had invited Taliban leaders to the Camp David presidential retreat and abruptly called off the event. He followed this news by declaring that talks between the U.S. and the Taliban were “dead”, in effect scuttling the more important negotiations among Afghans that were to follow.
In reality, however, Washington has no good alternative to reviving talks on the same basis as before the disruption. The U.S. should pick up where it left off, concluding an agreement that sets the stage for an intra-Afghan peace process and thus offers hope of ending Afghanistan’s decades-long war.
Trump’s skippering of talks has not improved Washington’s limited options in Afghanistan. First, the U.S. could unilaterally withdraw its forces, irrespective of progress toward intra-Afghan negotiations. In this case, the conflict would continue, with violence likely intensifying as the Taliban seek to capitalize on U.S. withdrawal and the anti-Taliban forces engage in an existential fight.
Afghan government forces and allied militias could fracture, particularly if U.S. and other funding decline. Afghanistan’s neighbors and other regional powers would likely back proxies in the ensuing multi-sided struggle. As U.S. force levels have fallen, battlefield dynamics have steadily shifted in the insurgents’ favor.
Option two would see the U.S. maintain current or somewhat reduced troop numbers continue to back up Afghan government counter-insurgency operations in the hope of altering Taliban calculations, and continue to conduct counter-terrorism strikes and raids from inside the country. “Staying the course”, as this option is often dubbed, is also a recipe for war with no foreseeable end.
Over the past decade, despite the U.S. deploying many times more troops (at the peak) than it would plausibly commit today, the U.S. and government forces have not defeated the Taliban. As U.S. force levels have fallen, battlefield dynamics have steadily shifted in the insurgents’ favor. Afghans would pay a high price for either of the first two options. Already, the war in Afghanistan is the world’s deadliest.
The third and best option is to pursue a negotiated settlement of the conflict. This policy choice requires reopening talks with the Taliban as a next step. The Camp David debacle set back talks but probably not fatally; Talban leaders have indicated that they are willing to return to negotiations.
Diplomatic spadework would be needed to get the Afghan government to retreat from its critical rhetoric about the draft deal that burst into the open after the debacle, but this may need to wait for the dust to settle from the 28 September presidential election. The U.S. also would need to rebuild regional powers’ confidence in its commitment to the negotiations route.
In our view, In any case, political process between Taliban and USA should be continued. Al l concerned countries, however, should use Moscow format as it is more reliable and has been determined to resolve the issue. Moscow conference held on 24 October 2019 also demanded for continuation USA and Afghan negotiations.
Russian role in Afghan peace process seems to be positive as it knows the horror of war and it has left Afghanistan when it understood that it cannot continue the war. Russia did not give any threat as Donald Trump the American president has given that the power of SA can win the war but it has to kill millions of people.
This is humanly behavior. USA is not the not the power of the region but Russia is. So let the countries around Afghanistan facilitate the peace process and Russia has taken the lead enjoining the support the support of all the regional countries including Pakistan, Iran and China and even Afghan Taliban.