The Wakhan Corridor is a fiercely contested imperial hangover
By Sam Dunning
But these circumstances are fragile and rapidly changing. The Taliban have proved in the past that they are independent-minded and belligerent above all else. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence will always be a wild card in regional affairs, and there are plenty of other, smaller jihadi groups operating in the region that could undermine cooperative efforts between the bigger players.
Pakistan will have to tread carefully, as it will not be keen on seeing its own version of the Taliban, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, inspired by seeing their counterparts across the border forming an Islamic emirate. And China’s own approach to diplomatic engagements is also a major risk factor: If Beijing tries any of its increasingly abrasive, so-called wolf warrior diplomacy against the major players, for whatever ill-judged reasons, things could revert to their chaotic norm.
Beijing is therefore very cautious in the way it is approaching the Afghanistan problem. The last thing the leadership in Beijing wants is to be mired in the kind of quagmire the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves inor to face Islamist blowback if things go off the rails. The Chinese government’s activities have been quiet because it wants to maintain as much global deniability as possible.
China’s leaders are working the diplomatic back channels hard, but any visible engagement in the country will be concealed through obscuring veils: Any economic investment will be led by ostensibly private companies, any issues relating to security for economic projects will be managed by private mercenary groups, financing and guarantees will likely go through many middlemen, and so on.
This will deviate quite substantially from the usual investment diplomacy playbook that Beijing has honed over the past two decades, where its efforts are usually highly public and serve propaganda purposes both domestically and internationally. Even if an Afghanistan free of U.S. influence may play into China’s hands for now, the implications of the U.S. withdrawal may be serious for Beijing.
But neither the success nor failure of Beijing’s efforts in Afghanistan need necessarily be a bad thing in light of Washington’s original primary objective after 9/11, which was to ensure Afghanistan did not become a haven for terrorist groups. If Chinese intervention manages to support stability in the region, it will be more likely than the United States’ own efforts there to stamp out the kind of jihadism that might spill over to the West. And if China tries to get more deeply involved and fails to bring peace, it could be Chinese investment interests that start absorbing the attention of jihadis fighting external enemies.
Even if an Afghanistan free of U.S. influence may play into China’s hands for now, the implications of the U.S. withdrawal may have serious consequences for Beijing. The Biden administration is hoping the resources and, more importantly, attention that Washington would otherwise be utilizing in Afghanistan can now be redeployed to the Indo-Pacific to counter the expansionist ambitions of Beijing, including against Taiwan and in the South China Sea.
With the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States may lose all traction in that part of South Asia, but the region is no longer of imminent strategic interest for the White House. The Indo-Pacific is. Shifting focus to the latter conflict theater could be a much better investment in countering China in the long termeven if it has come at the cost of U.S. pride and at a terrible price for Afghan civilians.